PhaenEx
HASANA SHARP: Intellectual autobiographies probably all involve quite a bit of contingency.
There weren't really considered reasons that led me to turn to Spinoza. Spinoza was simply part of my turning on to philosophy. Yet, it may help to note that Spinoza was part of a cluster of figures that prompted my addiction to philosophy, and the others were Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Macherey. So, really, it makes perfect sense that you frame the question the way that you did. I had the good luck to be introduced to all of these figures by an exciting professor as an undergraduate (Warren Montag), who presented their views such that they seemed immediately relevant to my lived concerns with feminist, queer, and anti-racist politics.
These figures all suggested to me new ways to think about freedom, transformation, and, in particular, the difficulties of struggle and change on a personal and collective level.
What Spinoza's rationalism offers, it seems to me, is a liberation from the moralism, frustration, and misanthropy that accompanies humanism (or, to use your language, idealism), according to which humanity is that special kind of being that can transcend its circumstances and act in contradiction to natural determination. I suspect that many young feminists, for example, find themselves deeply upset by concomitant experience of consciousness-raising and powerlessness. I found Spinoza's philosophy to be a rich therapeutic and intellectual resource for working through the resilience of damaging thought patterns, institutions, and discourses, and for trying to envision new forms of activism and critique. In short, I was enchanted in the last 18 months of my undergraduate career and have not been able to shake him since that fateful moment. I was lucky in my Master's program that I immediately found some co-conspirators among the students, and we forged a tight bond reading Spinoza, Marx, and Marxist philosophy.
In fact, we dubbed ourselves "the materialist workshop" and morphed into the Society for Social and Political Philosophy, to which you have contributed many fine papers! Peter Gratton meant, but to most others it was nonsensical to speak of Spinoza as a materialist. When I began working on Spinoza in the mid-to late-1990s, most Spinoza scholars were writing in the tradition of Leo Strauss or Jonathan Bennett and Ed Curley, and so the only people who could understand this idiom were very few, were in Australia, or were not in my discipline. Although the idea of "renaturalization" is also tightly bound to a tradition of Continental feminist theory, my hope is that it doesn't arouse the immediate skepticism that my earlier invocations of materialism did. On the one hand, it is a strange word, so perhaps readers are willing to let me stipulate a definition. Since many think they know what materialism means, they may not be as -272 -PhaenEx willing to let it do work that it does not typically do. On the other hand, naturalism is not at all a strange word, and neither is it counterintuitive to apply it to Spinoza's philosophy. In the end, the fact that I don't have to do the work to show how and why it might make sense to think about Spinoza as part of a materialist tradition may suggest that another terminology is more apt. These words are really lines in the sand, anyway, and perhaps it is a good idea to use one that is not as obviously partisan. Though, in a partisan spirit perhaps, I did want to ally myself with ecological philosophy and politics (especially the renegade ecofeminism of Haraway and Grosz-though I know the latter disowns that term), and the project of critically rethinking nature. not something that can be brought about by human will. Transformation must begin with work on webs of relations, on what I call "ecosystems" or networks of ideas and affects. This is entirely compatible with feminist and anti-racist analysis that emphasizes work on institutions, structures, linguistic habits, etc. Yet, I think an approach also armed with the renaturalist thesis poses less of a risk of dividing the "enlightened" from the ideologically duped. The renaturalist critics (you know, that massive group!) are in no way inoculated from the effects of the ideas they criticize. They should not see themselves and others as failures insofar as they cannot embody the feminist or anti-racist critique. Rather, our own feelings of misogyny and racism are indices of the power that these ideas exert in our milieus, a sign of how much of the fight still remains, and of how many more allies are needed to feel and live differently.
I haven't really addressed your concerns about my embrace of the language of vitalism and natural science. Certainly, no language is innocent, and no theoretical apparatus is immune 
